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Brexit and Government Procurement 
 
Kamala Dawar1 
 
 
 
This briefing paper looks at some of the legal issues that will affect the UK’s public 
procurement laws and policies following Brexit. For, once the UK revokes the European 
Communities Act 1972, it will no longer be obligated to follow the EU Procurement Directives, 
nor will it be subject to the commitments the EU has signed up to on behalf of the UK in 
the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and in Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs). Additionally, under the Devolution Settlement of 1998, the competence 
for public procurement was transferred to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; internal, 
centrifugal forces will therefore also impact on the design of the public procurement regime 
in the UK after Brexit.  
Brexit could fragment government procurement policy within the UK, as well as disrupting 
the UK’s relationship with the WTO GPA and other preferential procurement agreements. 
This paper addresses these challenges and puts forward a response to some of the potentially 
negative consequences of Brexit that could undermine value for money, transparency and 
competition within the UK’s lucrative markets for government procurement contracts.  
 
Key Points 
 
 When the UK leaves the EU, it is unlikely to be able to simply rollover its current 
procurement coverage. However, this opens up the possibility of pursuing horizontal 
policy objectives, such as promoting SME or green public procurement, which is 
possible under the WTO GPA obligations, but will also need to comply with other 
multilateral rules. 
 As procurement is an area of responsibility for the devolved governments, different 
parts of the UK will no longer have to apply the same public procurement rules. This 
could undermine a coherent public procurement law and policy at the UK level, as 
well as transparency, competition and value for money. 
 One way to ensure non-discriminatory, transparent and fair public procurement is to 
bring the competition authority and the procurement agencies closer together. Such 
an integrated approach would be beneficial for value for money, legal clarity, and 
enforcement. It would help to ensure conformity to WTO commitments, while acting 
as a counterweight against fragmentation. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The sheer value of public procurement contracts make them important both economically 
and for providing society with essential public goods, services and infrastructure. China's 
government procurement market totalled approximately $88 billion in 2008 – more than 
triple the amount in 2003. The EU’s procurement market was worth over €1500 billion – 
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over 16 per cent of total EU GDP – in 2004, and grew to over €2150 billion in 2008.2  In 
2013/14, the UK public sector spent a total of £242 billion on procurement of goods and 
services. This sum accounted for 33% of UK public sector spending3 and 13% of GDP4 – so 
ensuring good public procurement policy is beneficial to markets and taxpayers.  
Currently, the UK’s procurement laws fall under the application of the EU’s 2014 
Procurement Directives for Goods and Services, Utilities and Concessions. The EU has also 
negotiated the coverage of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement on behalf of all 
28 EU Member States and various PTAs, most recently the EU-Canada CETA, which 
includes a comprehensive chapter of public procurement provisions.  
The Great Repeal Bill aims to revoke the European Communities Act 1972 and to incorporate 
current applicable EU law into an Act of Parliament. Additionally, following the Devolution 
Settlement of 1998, certain competences – including public procurement – were devolved to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. So, unless the laws affecting devolved issues are 
unilaterally scrapped by Westminster as a consequence of Brexit, the Great Repeal Bill will 
result in decentralising government procurement legislation. This could potentially fragment 
a coherent UK-wide procurement strategy towards the WTO GPA, as well as in its PTAs. 
This paper assesses the legal challenges and opportunities for the UK’s public procurement 
laws and policies after Brexit. Section 1 briefly examines the issue of sequencing government 
procurement negotiations after Article 50 TEU has been triggered. Section 2 then examines 
the options open to the UK in the renegotiating of its procurement rules externally - at the 
WTO GPA and in its PTAs - as well as internally, in relation to the Devolution Settlement 
and decentralised procurement policy in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  
 
 
 
Section 1: Government Procurement After Brexit: the International Context  
 
While the UK government can enter into informal discussions regarding its future trading 
arrangements – including public procurement – with third parties, the UK is unlikely to sign 
any agreements until it has withdrawn from the EU and repositioned itself with regard to the 
WTO and the EU itself.  
 
First, to conclude a trade agreement with a non-EU party while the UK is still formally a 
Member State of the EU would be in breach of Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, which provides the 
EU with exclusive competence in determining common commercial policy on behalf of its 
Member States. Serious conflicts of interest would also likely surface, in breach of Article 4.3 
and Article 24.3 TFEU. These laws obligate Member States to refrain from any action which 
is contrary to the objectives of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations. Formal negotiations would breach the principle of good faith 
the UK has towards the TFEU – until it detaches itself from the EU. This is not a trivial 
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point. Good faith is a fundamental principle of international law codified in Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,5 without which surely all international law would 
collapse. 
 
Second, from a negotiator’s perspective the legal framework for negotiating a free trade 
agreement is primarily the WTO’s MFN exceptions, under Article XXIV GATT and Article 
V GATS. A prerequisite to repositioning the UK’s trade terms post-Brexit is therefore going 
to involve establishing the UK’s MFN commitments under the GATT and GATS, with all 
the other 164 or more Members – including the EU. Some commentators have argued 
otherwise – that the UK is already a WTO Member with independent rights and obligations, 
including those relating to its MFN coverage in goods and services.6 This seems an optimistic 
and overly simplistic interpretation in the case of services under the GATS schedules, where 
the UK’s commitments are set out both independently and jointly with the EU. The UK will 
need independently to set out its GATS Schedule whether or not it is certified by other WTO 
Members, because the UK needs a schedule upon which to trade.7 So, it is not until the UK 
has formally determined its MFN coverage under the WTO that the UK can seek to negotiate 
a more favourable trade agreement in accordance with the WTO’s MFN exceptions under 
the GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  
 
 
 
 
The UK’s Accession to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA) 
 
The UK is currently a signatory party to the 2014 Revised WTO GPA through its 
membership of the EU. It has not had to ratify this agreement as an individual party. The 
total value contracted by the 27 Member States of the EU and covered by GPA in 2012 was 
€283.4 billion. 8 The UK accounts for 84% of the total value procured at EU level in awards 
of more than €100 million.9  The US Government Accountability Office estimates the value 
of the EU’s total procurement markets to be US$1.6 trillion, the US’ total procurement 
market at US$1.7 trillion, and the aggregate value of the other WTO GPA parties at US$1.1 
trillion.10 
After Brexit, the EU will need to remove the UK’s coverage from the EU’s WTO GPA 
schedules by notifying the other parties to the WTO GPA of any proposed modifications to 
their commitments, pursuant to WTO GPA Article XIX. The removal of the UK schedules 
will create a gap in the value of the EU’s schedules and the EU will need to modify its 
schedules and market access commitments on the basis of reciprocity. Alternatively, they 
must compensate the other parties to the WTO GPA on the loss of coverage follow the UK’s 
detachment, pursuant to Article XIX WTO GPA covering modifications and rectifications 
to coverage. This provision requires, among other things, notification to the Committee of 
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any proposed modification of its annexes to Appendix I, along with information as to the 
likely consequences of the change for the coverage provided for by the WTO GPA. 
Valuing the UK’s procurement coverage separately from the EU is not straightforward. First, 
there are elements of the UK’s coverage that are tied into the EU’s procurement schedules. 
For example, under the WTO GPA Annex 2 the EU’s sub-central government entities 
coverage for regional or local contracting authorities, sets out indicative rather than clearly 
defined coverage for each Member State.11 Second, parties to the WTO GPA cannot commit 
procurements for services under the WTO GPA Annexes unless these services markets have 
been opened up under the GATS schedules. So, before the UK can negotiate its own 
coverage under the WTO GPA, it needs to reset its MFN commitments in GATS schedules. 
Among the nine parties currently acceding to the WTO GPA are Australia, China and Russia, 
while India, for example, is an observer. Should the UK wish to influence these significant 
trading partners’ market access negotiations before they join, it would be wise for the UK to 
accede before these parties. 
 
The WTO GPA depends on highly complex bilateral negotiations between the different 
Parties because a Party is not required to give the same commitments to all trading partners.12 
The WTO GPA Annex negotiations are based upon four basic variables: i) the value of 
procurement – covering only contracts estimated to exceed a certain value threshold; ii) the 
identity of the procuring entity – covering only those listed by each party in its annexes; iii) 
the type of goods or services procured – consisting of all goods, apart from some expressly 
excluded by each party, and only services listed by each party in its annexes; and iv) the origin 
of the goods or services – including only countries that are GPA parties.  
 
Currently, as a party to the WTO GPA, the EU opens up all procurement above specified 
value thresholds, which is already covered by the EU directives. However, this coverage is 
highly qualified bilaterally, depending on the level of reciprocity. Significantly, the EU did not 
negotiate carve-out protections from the WTO GPA’s obligations for SMEs and nor did the 
EU aim to negotiate concessions that matched the SME objectives of other parties. This is 
because the internal EU (then, the European Community) procurement directives were 
promulgated to liberalise the internal market among its Member States. The rationale and 
principles embodied in the Procurement Directives are historically based on trade 
liberalisation.13 So EU negotiators sought instead to explicitly penalise the US, Korea and 
Japan for discriminating in favour of their SMEs in procurement contract awards.14 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
11 https://e-
gpa.wto.org/en/Annex/Details?Agreement=GPA113&Party=EuropeanUnion&AnnexNo=2&ContentCultu
re=en 
12 The coverage of the Agreement is set out for each signatory party in Appendix I, which is divided into 
Annexes concerning the specific coverage of the obligations. The Annexes address: 1) central government 
entities covered by the Agreement; 2) covered sub-central government entities; 3) "other" covered entities 
(e.g. utilities); 4) goods; 5) services coverage; 6) coverage of construction services; and 7) General Notes. 
13 For discussion, see S. Arrowsmith, ‘The Purpose of the EU Procurement Directives: Ends, Means and the 
Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal Procurement Policies’ (2012) 14 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1-47. 
14 https://e-gpa.wto.org/report/coverage 
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Section 2: Options for UK Public Procurement Law and Policy 
 
The UK’s public procurement policy has been historically directed towards promoting 
competitive, commercial public purchasing. The UK government has singled out particularly 
uncompetitive public procurement markets such as communications networks, for example, 
because of their high barriers to entry for new businesses, economies of scope and scale, 
network effects, and technical gateways or bottlenecks that may give their owners market 
power. 15  Overall, the UK has been seen to have played a positive role in shaping EU 
procurement rules along commercial rather than bureaucratic lines.16  
Yet, prior to implementing the EU procurement directives, the UK did not have a significant 
body of public procurement law or legal rules. Rather it relied in the main on administrative 
guidance from the Treasury for specific purposes, such as promoting value for money and 
controlling corruption in procurement processes. It was through the transposition of the EU 
Procurement Directives that a more legal approach was introduced into UK procurement 
practices. So to the extent that the objective of EU public procurement law is to open up the 
internal procurement market to tenderers from all other Member States, this transposition 
has introduced greater competition and promoted value for money – in line with previous 
UK procurement policy.   
After Brexit, a pragmatic short-term solution would be to retain current regulations for the 
award procedures under the Great Repeal Act, but without conferring their benefits to 
suppliers from third parties without reciprocal arrangements. The freedom from the 
imposition of EU Procurement Directives will have implications for the UK’s internal 
procurement policy. As a consequence of the devolution settlement of 1998, public 
procurement became an area of responsibility for the devolved governments of Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Following Brexit, the different parts of the UK will no longer 
be forced to apply the same public procurement rules, and different policy objectives are 
likely to appear in the award of procurement contracts, promoting different local economic 
development and social goals.  
 
The value of procurement in the different areas and sectors is also varied. Table 1 sets out 
the total budget broken down into different departments. The National Health Service is by 
far the biggest spender of the procurement budget, with more than double the share of 
defence. Table 1 highlights the relative significance of procurement spent by Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. This decentralising dynamic could undermine a coherent public 
procurement law and policy at the UK level, as well as transparency, competition and value 
for money. 
 
Insert Table 1. 
  
                                                        
15 Department of Trade and Industry Report (2000, December) ‘A new future for communications’. HMSO, 
London. 
16 For example, in the provisions on framework agreements and competitive dialogue introduced in 2004 and 
in the introduction or adoption of measures that were of concern to the UK in the 2014 reform process such 
as the “mutual” exemption and wider use of award procedures involving negotiation. See: Sue Arrowsmith. 
Brexit Whitepaper: The implications of Brexit for the law on public and utilities procurement. Achilles 
Briefing paper 2016. https://www.achilles.com/images/locale/en-EN/buyer/pdf/UK/sue-arrowsmith-
brexit-whitepaper.pdf 
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Horizontal policy objectives Post Brexit: The case of SME Promotion 
 
In 2013/14, the UK public sector spent a total of £242 billion on procurement of goods and 
services. There is political pressure to use this sum to pursue a variety of public policy aims, 
such as promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or encouraging local growth. 
Indeed, both of these objectives were stated aims of the UK’s coalition government of 2010-
2015, which in 2013/14, set a target for central government to procure 25% of goods and 
services by value from small and medium-sized enterprises. The 2015 Conservative manifesto 
included a pledge to increase the percentage spent with small and medium-sized enterprises 
to a third.17  
Following Brexit, when negotiating its accession terms to the WTO GPA the UK has the 
option of avoiding the current legal impasse the EU has encountered when promoting SMEs 
though government procurement contract awards. If the UK so choses, it can establish a 
comprehensive policy framework to promote SMEs, in line with other signatory parties such 
as the US, Japan and S. Korea. The UK could  negotiate specific carve outs for its small 
medium sized enterprises, for example, for this would provide the legal discretion for and 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to pursue such policies, while maintaining a coherent 
UK procurement framework to pursue in trade agreements. 
 
There are various other policy objectives that the devolved regions of the UK may also 
choose to pursue through public procurement awards. A 2013 study based on EU Tender 
Electronic Data (TED) 18  assessing the use of public procurement for promoting the 
environment – or green public procurement (GPP), social responsible public procurement 
(SRPP) and public procurement for innovation indicates that the UK is the leader in all three 
categories. (See Table 2)19 However, recent WTO disputes indicate that procurement policies 
promoting industrial or environmental policies are actionable under various multilateral 
agreements, even if they have been exempted from the WTO GPA commitments.20 The UK 
will need to ensure that horizontal policy objectives implemented through devolved 
procurement awards are in compliance not only with the WTO GPA, but also under other 
multilateral rules including the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
the GATT, GATS and the TRIMs.  
 
Insert Table 2.21 
 
 
  
                                                        
17 Crown Commercial Services. Procurement Policy Note – Reforms to make public procurement more 
accessible to SMEs Information Note 03/15 18th February 2015. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/405020/PPN_reforms_to_make_
public_procurement_more_accessible_to_SMEs.pdf 
18 “Strategic use of public procurement in promoting green, social and innovation policies” Final Report DG 
GROW Framework Contract N° MARKT/2011/023/B2/ST/FC for Evaluation, Monitoring and Impact 
Assessment of Internal Market DG Activities. 
19 A caveat with these figures is the variable quality of information in the different Member State’s TED files. 
20 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, 6 May 2013, 
WT/DS412/AB/R and WT/DS426/AB/R, ¶1.31. Report of the Appellate Body. India – Certain Measures 
Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules AB-2016-3 Report of the Appellate Body. WT/DS456/AB/R. 16 
September 2016 ¶5.32. 
21 “Strategic use of public procurement in promoting green, social and innovation policies.” Final Report DG 
GROW Framework Contract N° MARKT/2011/023/B2/ST/FC for Evaluation, Monitoring and Impact 
Assessment of Internal Market DG Activities. 
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Can the UK Buy Better after Brexit?  
 
Ensuring non-discriminatory, transparent and fair public procurement is seen as the best way 
for citizens and tax-payers to obtain the best public goods and services available, and at the 
best value for money. To achieve this, procurement markets need competition. One way to 
facilitate this is to bring the competition authority and the procurement agencies closer 
together.  There has been a tendency to perceive government procurement laws as largely 
focused on establishing the contractual arrangements for buying public goods and services. 
Competition law, on the other hand, has been seen as being largely focused on addressing 
private restraints of competition that prevents markets from being contestable and damaging 
to consumers. This approach is evident in the UK, where the Crown Commercial Services 
(CCS) is responsible for implementing the legal framework for public sector procurement 
and leads on the development and implementation of procurement policies for government.22 
Competition law, on the other hand, is enforced by the UK Competition and Markets 
Authority.23 
 
Under this separated perspective, very limited interaction is envisaged between competition 
and government procurement law. The two bodies of economic regulation seem to have 
different objectives and consequently seem to offer weak reasons for their joint study or for 
the development of consistent rules and remedies.24 Yet, from an economic perspective, 
competition principles are generally applicable to public procurement. They can be seen most 
obviously in the area of bid rigging and collusion amongst tenderers for public contracts.25 
The complexity of competition effects from procurement means that the public sector can 
both promote and restrict competition - either by helping firms to overcome barriers to entry 
or by adopting procurement practices that restrict participation or discriminate against 
particular firms.26 The interdependent nature of competition and procurement laws also 
emerges in the impact of subsidies / State aid in public procurement markets. Such factors 
contribute to determine the competitiveness of markets where the public buyer sources 
goods, works and services, and can constrain the ability of the public buyer to obtain 
allocative efficiency and value for money.  
In the EU, Article 101 TFEU sets out the targets of competition law in two stages with the 
term undertaking. Any entity engaged in an economic activity that consists of offering goods or 
services on a given market, regardless of its legal status and the way in which it is financed, is 
to be considered an undertaking. No intention to earn profits is required, nor are public 
bodies by definition excluded.27 In effect, this term is used to describe nearly anyone that is 
engaged in an economic activity, 28  except employees 29  and public services based on 
                                                        
22 The implementation of the Public Contracts Regulations took effect from February 2015. See 
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/crown-commercial-service 
23 The CMA derives most of their powers from the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Competition Act 1998. See: 
www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority 
24 Albert Sánchez Graells. “Public Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?” 21(6) Public Procurement 
Law Review. 2012:205-212. 
25 Weishaar, S.E., Cartels, Competition and Public Procurement. Edward Elgar. June 2013. 
26 See for example, Laffont, J-J. and J. Tirole (1994) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 
MIT Press, London. They contend that procurement is a special case of regulation in which the roles of 
principal (regulator or designer of contract mechanisms) and buyer are combined; The UK Office of Fair 
Trading. Assessing the impact of public sector procurement on competition. Volume 2 – case studies 
(OFT742b). September 2004.  
27 The Commission published this definition on DG Competition’s web-site at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/u_en.html#t62 
28 Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979 (C-41/90). 
29 See AG Jacobs, Albany International BV (1999). 
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"solidarity" for a "social purpose.” A public undertaking, on the other hand, is an undertaking 
over which public authorities directly or indirectly exercise dominant influence by virtue of 
their ownership, financial participation, or the rules that govern it.30  
However, the boundaries between competition and procurement blur because the objects of 
EU procurement law and competition law are similar and complementary. The principal 
objective of the procurement rules is “the free movement of services … and the opening-up to undistorted 
competition in all the Member States.” The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) also issued a revised 
interpretation of the concept of an undertaking for the purposes of the application of EU 
competition law to encompass economic agents engaging in a combination of both economic 
and non-economic activities.31 In the EasyPay case, the CJEU determined that an activity will 
be considered as economic - unless it has links with another activity that fulfils an exclusively 
social function - based on the principle of solidarity and entirely non-profit making. 
Moreover, such an activity must, by its nature, aims and the rules to which it is subject, be 
‘inseparably’ connected to its social function.32  
The EasyPay Judgment was significant in departing from existing case law33 to confirm that 
for the purposes of the application of EU competition law, an undertaking is any entity – 
even a procurement agency - engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal status 
and the way in which it is financed. And further, that any activity consisting in offering goods 
and services on a given market is an economic activity.34 Of additional relevance here is the 
2014 High Court in England ruling on the application of the UK competition rules to tender 
design of an exclusive concessions contract tendered to Luton Operations to run a bus service 
between the airport bus terminal and central London.35 In this case, the contracting authority 
was found to have abused its dominant position by negotiating a seven-year deal with the 
successful bidder when there would have been sufficient capacity for a second operator after 
three years. The long exclusivity generated a higher return for Luton Operations, which was 
held to be bad for consumers and an abuse of dominance in the buying market.  
 
Integrating a competition approach to public procurement  
The UK could chose to reinforce a competition approach to public procurement and house 
public procurement directly under the supervision of the competition authority. Supervision 
activities could be orientated towards preventing illegal awards of contracts. Precedents exist, 
for example, in Sweden the Public Procurement Act of 2010 provides the Swedish 
Competition Authority the possibility to take cases of illegal direct award of contracts to 
court. A company that infringes the Competition Act also risks being debarred from bidding 
for procurement contracts. Likewise in the Czech Republic, the Office for the Protection of 
Competition is the central authority of state administration responsible for creating 
                                                        
30 A dominant influence of public authorities is in particular presumed when they: a) hold the major part of 
the undertaking's subscribed capital, b) control the majority of the votes attached to shares issued by the 
undertaking or c) are in a position to appoint more than half of the members of the undertaking's 
administrative, managerial or supervisory body. 
31 Judgment in EasyPay and Finance Engineering, C-185/14, EU:C:2015:716.   
32 See Sanchez-Graells, Albert and Herrera Anchustegui, Ignacio, Revisiting the Concept of Undertaking from 
a Public Procurement Law Perspective – A Discussion on EasyPay and Finance Engineering (November 26, 
2015).  Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695742  
33 Judgment in FENIN v Commission, C-205/03 P, EU:C:2006:453; Judgment in Selex Sistemi Integrati v 
Commission, C-113/07 P, EU:C:2009:191    
34 See Stadt Halle (C-26/03) 
35 Arriva the Shires Ltd v London Luton Airport Operations Ltd [2014] EWHC 64 (Ch) 
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conditions that favour and protect competition, supervision over public procurement and 
consultation and monitoring in relation to the provision of state aid. For the UK to follow 
such an integrated approach would be beneficial, to both open procurement markets, and for 
legal clarity and enforcement.  
Promoting this integrated approach to implementing competition and public procurement 
law and policy may also be helpful in counterbalancing the centrifugal forces of devolution, 
undermining the benefits of competition in public procurement. For example, this could 
involve centralised monitoring of horizontal policy objectives through procurement awards 
in the different regions of the UK, following a similar assessment and surveillance system. 
This would also provide a more transparent, coherent and competitive framework for 
potential bidders, which would be of particular benefit to SMEs that wish to enter these 
lucrative markets. Currently the EU has one of the most developed State aid control systems 
in the world. The UK is likely to continue to apply some form of State aid control following 
Brexit. Providing the UK competition authority with the mandate to oversee the monitoring 
and enforcement of competition law, State aid control and public procurement rules would 
help to ensure that decentralised legislation conforms to WTO commitments towards non-
discrimination and subsidy control. Such centralised supervisory powers could also act as a 
counterweight against legal fragmentation, which could disproportionately undermine 
economies of scale as well as the benefits of competition and value for money in public 
procurement following the devolution of these competencies.  
 
Brexit could therefore offer the UK the possibility to craft a procurement system flexible 
enough to incorporate the devolved procurement legislation, under the supervision of the 
Competition and Markets Authority. The UK could design a more simplified and flexible 
legislative framework in place of the over-cumbersome procurement rules currently spread 
over several EU Directives, with over-bureaucratic award procedures and relatively expensive 
legal enforcement mechanisms.36 This streamlined regime would still be in compliance with 
the framework established under the WTO GPA.  
  
                                                        
36 Sue Arrowsmith. Brexit Whitepaper: The implications of Brexit for the law on public and utilities 
procurement. Achilles Briefing paper 2016. https://www.achilles.com/images/locale/en-
EN/buyer/pdf/UK/sue-arrowsmith-brexit-whitepaper.pdf 
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Conclusions 
 
This briefing paper has examined the sequencing of negotiations that need to take place 
before the UK can sign procurement agreements either within the WTO GPA, or agree new 
FTAs be they deep or shallow. Even if, optimistically, the UK can sidestep the issues involved 
in separating its schedules under the GATS from those of the EU, and can maintain its 
existing MFN commitments, it will still need to formally reset these with the WTO 
membership before it can seek to negotiate its accession to the WTO GPA, or other 
preferential trade agreements. These negotiations will involve the EU and could be protracted 
and highly politicised, particularly if the UK breaches its good faith obligations towards the 
TFEU before it detaches its Membership.  
 
If the UK were to recast its procurement procedures under the framework of the WTO 
GPA’s minimum standards template, it would still have some flexibility to simplify and unify 
its procurement rules, as well as to formally exempt certain sectors, such as SMEs, from 
coverage of the commitments. However, this greater freedom to pursue horizontal policy 
objectives could also lead to greater divergence between the different devolved procurement 
legislation in the UK, as a consequence of the devolution settlement of 1998. Such increased 
regional diversity could operate to undermine competition, transparency and value for money 
within UK public procurement markets, as well as detracting from a strong and unified 
external negotiating strategy.  
 
One way of checking and balancing some of these developments is to establish cooperation 
and coordinated measures to foster competition and value for money in public procurement 
policies. This could include, at the limit, integrating the competition and public procurement 
agencies together within a single agency competent to address anti-competitive practices such 
as bid rigging, merger control and State aid, which affect both open and public procurement 
markets across the UK. This agency could monitor and supervise regional horizontal policy 
objectives, such as SMEs or sustainable development, in public procurement processes. This 
would provide some centralised coordination to assess whether such measures are 
proportionate to their stated objectives and ensure that they do not undermine the very policy 
objective they intend to meet. Centralised surveillance mechanisms could also assess whether 
such measures are legally compliant with international and regional trade and procurement 
obligations.  
 
This briefing paper therefore concludes by hoping that what could be a relatively 
straightforward discussion concerned with improving transparency, competition and value 
for money when awarding public procurement contracts, is not overshadowed by complex 
sequencing of negotiations, intra-UK jurisdictional divergences, and intractable political 
legacies with the EU. 
 
